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DISCHARGEABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY
OF DEBTS INCURRED BY
"PURPORTED PURCHASERS"
STEVEN H. RESNICOFF*
INTRODUCTION
Although bankruptcy law empowers individual debtors to dis-
charge their debts and thereby enjoy a financial "fresh start,"' cer-
tain debts are nondischargeable for competing policy reasons.2
Whether or not the debt incurred through credit purchases by per-
sons fraudulently representing themselves to be good faith buyers
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; B.A., Princeton Uni-
versity (1974); J.D., Yale Law School (1978); Rabbinic Degree, Beth Medrash Govoha
(1983). Copyright 1990 by Steven H. Resnicoff.
This Article represents the expansion and development of an idea that the author origi-
nally raised in Ginsberg, Bankruptcy (2d ed. 1989), at section 11.06[d], to which the author
of this Article is a contributing author. The author expresses his gratitude to Shalom Kohn,
Esq., who reviewed and commented on earlier drafts of this Article.
' See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6086. "The purpose of straight bankruptcy... is to obtain a fresh
start, free from creditor harassment and free from the worries and pressures of too much
debt." Id. The discharge is available to individual debtors who either surrender their non-
exempt property for distribution to their creditors in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, or
make payments to creditors from assets or future earnings pursuant to a confirmed Chapter
11, 12 or 13 plan. Id. at 6084-87.
The fresh-start goal is not essential to bankruptcy law, which could be understood sim-
ply as an efficient and equitable mechanism for distributing a debtor's assets to its creditors,
as well as a method of controlling debtor abuse. The earliest English statutory bankruptcy
law, for example, did not provide for a general discharge of debts. See Shuchman, The
Fraud Exception in Consumer Bankruptcy, 23 STAN. L. REv. 735, 737-39 (1971). American
bankruptcy law, however, has favored "deserving" debtors by providing them with a new
financial lease on life. Id. at 739. For a discussion of the policy considerations underlying the
fresh-start principle, see Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Historical Inventory and An Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 53-96 (1986);
Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 1047, 1048-68
(1987); Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HAV. L. REV. 1393, 1395-
1404 (1985).
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988). For example, a debtor may be denied a discharge of all
her debts, however incurred, if she commits certain specified fraudulent acts. Id.
§ 727(a)(4). Nonetheless, this Article restricts itself to the fraud exception from discharge
set forth in section 523(a)(2)(A).
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("purported purchasers") is dischargeable has engendered intense
and continuous judicial debate. Indeed, cases construing Bank-
ruptcy Code section 523(a)(2)(A), which governs the exceptions to
dischargeability of debt, dominate personal bankruptcy litigation.'
The controversy surrounding purported purchasers centers on
the fact that no express representations have been made to the
creditor. Under the immediate predecessor to section
523(a)(2)(A), a discharge was denied for debts incurred through
"false pretenses or false representations" only.5 Further, some
courts required that the "false pretenses or false representations"
be express, not merely implied.
This Article will contend that section 523(a)(2)(A) was care-
fully drafted to cover all liabilities resulting from intentional fraud,
whether or not the debtor made an express or implied misrepre-
sentation. It will further be suggested in this Article that judicial
action has frustrated the provision's purpose. First, many courts
have misconstrued the phrase "actual fraud." Second, courts have
failed to recognize that the policies underlying section 523(a)(2)(A)
demand that the purported purchaser's debts be treated similarly,
irrespective of whether a purchase is effectuated through the issu-
ance of a bad check,' use of a credit card, or in an "open account."
Instead, courts have reached divergent results depending upon the
method of purchase. By focusing on nonessential aspects of the
debtor's fraudulent conduct, courts have neglected to consider the
relevance of legal precedent dealing with fraud in a non-bank-
ruptcy context.
Part I will introduce the paradigm of the purported purchaser
and will suggest that inconsistent distinctions have been drawn
under the current case law. Part II will examine the history of the
fraud exception and will assert that section 523(a)(2)(A) applies to
purported purchasers. Part III will explore the case law construing
See Note, The Fraud Exception to Discharge in Bankruptcy: A Reappraisal, 38
STAN. L. REV. 891, 904 n.57 (1986) (§ 523(a)(2) and its statutory precursor have been most
frequently litigated exception to discharge).
' Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 523 (1988)).
6 See id.
a As used in this Article, the phrase "bad check" includes checks which are returned
because of insufficient funds, a closed account, forgery by the drawer, or any other reason.
The analytical approach proposed in this Article applies to all of these types of checks.
However, the bad check cases actually discussed in this Article only involve checks returned
for insufficient funds. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 64:2:253
DISCHARGEABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY
section 523(a)(2)(A) and will propose that an "actual fraud" stan-
dard must be applied under section 523(a)(2)(A) to ensure reason-
able and uniform results.
PART I: PARADIGM OF THE "PURPORTED PURCHASER"
The objectives of the fraud exception are (i) to punish dishon-
est debtors;7 (ii) to shift the burden of such dishonesty from inno-
cent creditors to dishonest debtors;8 and (iii) to deter fraudulent
conduct.'
A purported purchaser is one who purchases goods while sub-
jectively intending not to pay for them.10 For example, a purported
purchaser may know that she is insolvent and has no reasonable
likelihood of financial recovery.11 Alternatively, she may plan on
avoiding the debt in some other way, such as by concealing her
assets, leaving the jurisdiction, or using an assumed name.
See Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. Case, 755 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985) ("one
of the purposes of the fraud exception to discharge is to punish the debtor for engaging in
fraudulent conduct"); In re Alwan Brothers Co., 105 Bankr. 886, 892 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989)
(dishonest debtor is penalized by not being absolved of certain debts); In re Kroh, 88 Bankr.
987, 992 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (dishonest debtors not entitled to benefit of discharge of
debts); see also Shuchman, supra note 1, at 739 ("denial of the privilege of discharge for a
fraudulently procured debt may be best understood from the bankrupt's point of view as a
form of civil punishment for his fraud").
8 See In re Smigel, 90 Bankr. 935, 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) ("purpose of excluding
from discharge debts obtained by fraud is to protect lenders from dishonest debtors")
(quoting In re Bogstad, 779 F.2d 370, 372-73 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also In re Hanson, 104
Bankr. 261, 262 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1989) ("bankruptcy is not supposed to be a haven for the
dishonest debtor").
This concern for innocent creditors seems implicit in frequent judicial declarations that
the fraud exceptions are intended to ensure that relief designed for honest debtors should
not benefit dishonest ones. See, e.g., In re Ophaug, 827 F.2d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1987) (once
debtor proven dishonest, not entitled to "fresh start"); In re Hunter, 771 F.2d 1126, 1130
(8th Cir. 1985) (policy considerations underlying "fresh start" not applicable to dishonest
debtors); In re Sears, 102 Bankr. 781, 785 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (legislative history indi-
cates fraud exception not intended to benefit fraudulent debtors).
9 See, e.g., Hunter, 771 F.2d at 1130 ("Congress established a fraud exception to dis-
charge 'to discourage fraudulent conduct' ") (quoting In re Wilson, 12 Bankr. 363, 370
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981)); Birmingham Trust, 755 F.2d at 1477 ("By creating the fraud
exceptions to discharge, Congress sought to discourage fraudulent conduct"); Kroh, 88
Bankr. at 992 (same).
'0 More precisely, a purported purchaser is one who either purchases goods, property,
or services without the intent to pay for them, or obtains a loan without the intent to repay
it.
21 A particularly noxious practice occurs when a purported purchaser, on the eve of
bankruptcy, goes on a "spending spree," expecting that a bankruptcy discharge will relieve
any responsibility for the debts incurred.
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A purported purchaser conducts herself as though she were an
ordinary customer without disclosing her intent not to pay for her
purchases. Thus, a purported purchaser deceives the seller into be-
lieving that payment is intended and will be forthcoming, and the
seller releases the goods in reliance on such representation. 12
It should not matter that the deception is perpetrated by a
message impliedly conveyed; an implied misrepresentation can be
as deceitful, injurious, and condemnable as one stated expressly.
For instance, when a person makes a purchase by intentionally is-
suing a bad check, it is irrelevant whether or not the purchaser
states that the check is good. The mere presentation of the check
misleads the seller into believing that the purported purchaser
genuinely intends to pay; a debt incurred in this manner should
not be dischargeable.' 3 Yet, courts continue to distinguish between
express and implied misrepresentations. 4
Nor should it matter whether the implicit misrepresentation is
made by use of a bad check or a credit card. In each instance, the
seller is deceived to her detriment by conduct inducing her to be-
lieve that the purchaser intends to pay. Nevertheless, courts per-
sist in applying different rules to these essentially similar
situations. 15
11 The purported purchaser referred to in this Article is not someone who innocently
errs as to the balance of her checking account or misunderstands the extent of her current
indebtedness. Nor is it someone who honestly miscalculates the likelihood of improvement
of her financial affairs. No suggestion is intended that a discharge be denied to debts in-
curred in good faith. However, a dishonest debtor, acquiring goods or services on credit
without ever intending to pay, should not be allowed to discharge her debt; to do so would
victimize the creditor.
13 This Article does not set out to evaluate whether the fraud exception is well-founded.
The point of this Article is, simply, that implied and express misrepresentations should be
treated consistently.
14 Compare In re Martin, 70 Bankr. 146, 150 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) (need be clear
and convincing evidence that debtor made false representation to establish actual fraud)
with In re Gitelman, 74 Bankr. 492, 496 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) ("[flraud may also be ac-
complished by willful concealment or omission of material facts") and In re Schmidt, 70
Bankr. 634, 640 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) ("fraud may consist of silence, concealment or in-
tentional non-disclosure of a material fact").
11 Compare In re Hunter, 83 Bankr. 803, 804 (M.D. Fla. 1988) ("in order to establish
. . . fraud. . . [plaintiff] must prove that the debtor made a representation that the check
was good") with In re Burklow, 60 Bankr. 728, 731 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986) ("each time...
[debtor] charged an item.., he impliedly represented that he had both the intention and
the ability to pay") and Comerica Bank-Midwest v. Kouloumbris, 69 Bankr. 229, 230
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (use of credit card impliedly represented ability and intent to pay).
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PART II: No STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF EXPRESS
MIISREPRESENTATION
A. Statutory Language
The plain language of section 523(a)(2)(A) provides that three
distinct types of debts are nondischargeable: debts incurred
through "[1] false pretenses, [2] a false representation, or [3] ac-
tual fraud."1 Thus, the term "actual fraud" contemplated by sec-
tion 523(a)(2)(A) embraces conduct apart from false representa-
tions; otherwise, the phrase "actual fraud" would be redundant.17
The legislative and judicial history of the fraud exception to
the dischargeability of a debt buttresses the conclusion that the
purported purchaser, even if impliedly misrepresenting an intent
to pay, commits actual fraud within the meaning of section
523(a)(2)(A). Indeed, the history of section 523(a)(2)(A) strongly
suggests that Congress added the phrase "actual fraud" specifically
to reach the conduct of purported purchasers. The considerable at-
tention that Congress has accorded this issue suggests that the pre-
sent statutory language carefully and precisely reflects congres-
sional intent. The fact that the statute sets forth actual fraud as an
alternative to false representation strongly suggests that the fraud
need not involve an express misrepresentation.
B. History of the Fraud Exception
1. Prior to Section 523(a)(2)(A)
Before enacting Bankruptcy Code section 523 (a)(2)(A), Con-
gress experimented with various approaches to the dischargeability
of a debt which was incurred through fraud. 8 The Bankruptcy Act
of 1841 provided for a broad discharge of all debts "which shall not
have been created in consequence of a defalcation as a public of-
ficer, or as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, or while
acting in any other fiduciary capacity."' 9 Thus, any debt incurred
16 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1988).
17 Id. The presence of a comma and the word "or" between the words "representation"
and "actual" makes it clear that "actual fraud" is intended to be a separate ground for
nondischargeability.
18 See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
'8 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 *Stat. 440, 441 (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523 (1988)).
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by the debtor, other than in a fiduciary capacity, was discharge-
able. There was no reference to any generalized exception for debt
incurred through fraud.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, however, modified this rule. It
stated as follows: "No debt created by the fraud or embezzlement
of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while
acting in any fiduciary character, shall be discharged by proceed-
ings in bankruptcy."2
The United States Supreme Court interpreted this provision
in Ames v. Moir,21 which involved a debtor2 who had contracted
for an option to purchase alcoholic beverages from the plaintiff.
The contract allowed the debtor to call on the plaintiff to deliver
the beverages on or before a specified date.2 3 Based on the lower
court's finding that the debtor knew that he was insolvent when he
called for the delivery of goods, the Supreme Court held that the
debtor's conduct constituted fraud and that the debt was nondis-
chargeable.24 The Ames decision, therefore, is persuasive authority
for the proposition that actual fraud may be committed through an
implied misrepresentation.5
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act") 26 introduced yet an-
other version of the fraud exception. In section 17(a)(2), the Act
excepted from discharge "judgments in actions for frauds, . . .
property [obtained] by false pretenses or false representations, or
20 Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523 (1988)).
21 138 U.S. 306 (1891).
22 See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517 (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988)). Under this predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code, the debtor was re-
ferred to as a "bankrupt." Id.
22 Ames, 138 U.S. at 307.
24 Id. at 312. Critical to the decision was the time at which the debtor incurred the debt
for the beverages. If the debt was incurred at the time the contract was formed, when the
debtor had no fraudulent intent, the debt would be dischargeable. The Court held that the
debt was not incurred until the goods were received, at which time the debtor had a fraudu-
lent intent. Id. at 311-12.
22 The Court's discussion in Ames nowhere suggested that at the time the debtor called
for or received the goods, the debtor had made any factual misrepresentation. Moreover,
Ames has been interpreted as not requiring such a misrepresentation. See, e.g., In re Nut-
tall, 201 F. 557, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (according to Ames, failure to disclose intent not to pay
may sufficiently constitute fraud). This view of Ames would be consistent with dictum
found elsewhere which states that a person who purchases with the intent not to pay com-
mits fraud, and the debt is nondischargeable. See Kaufman v. Lindner, 67 How. Pr. (NY)
322, 323 (1884) (dictum).
26 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544 (current version at 11 U.S.C. §
523 (1988)).
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for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of an-
other. '21 7 In section 17(a)(4), the Act excluded debts which were
"created by ... [the debtor's] fraud, embezzlement, misappropri-
ation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary
capacity."2
Section 17(a)(2) was amended in 1903 so that debts were non-
dischargeable when incurred by "obtaining money or property by
false pretenses or false representations." The earlier references to
"frauds" and to "judgments" were eliminated.2 9 Nonetheless, many
courts ruled that the false pretenses or false representation stan-
dard of amended section 17(a)(2) could be met by an implied rep-
resentation; no express misrepresentation was necessary. For ex-
ample, a person who purchased goods without intending to pay for
them was held to have impliedly misrepresented her ability and
intention to pay, and debts so incurred were nondischargeable3 °
A few courts disagreed, holding that because the 1903 Amend-
ment removed all general references to "fraud" from section
17(a)(2), implied representation was insufficient to trigger the
fraud exception.31 The most prominent of these decisions is
Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell.3 2 Davison-Paxon involved a
27 Id. § 17(a)(2), (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1988)).
21 Id. § 17(a)(4), 30 Stat. at 550-51 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1988)).
29 See Bankruptcy Act of 1903, ch. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1988)).
20 See, e.g., In re White, 221 F. Supp. 64, 67 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (debt nondischargeable
because debtors acquired merchandise on credit with actual intent not to pay, thereby com-
mitting "actual fraud"); T.M. Donnelly Co. v. Milligan, 37 Ga. App. 530, 530-31, 140 S.E.
918, 919 (1927) ("[flalse misrepresentations may consist of the purchasing of goods with no
present purpose of paying for them"); Boerner v. Cicero Smith Lumber Co., 298 S.W. 545,
546 (Tex. App. 1927) ("intention not to pay will constitute ... fraud"); Brooks v. Pitts, 24
Ga. App. 386, 386, 100 S.E. 776, 776 (1919) (same); Atlanta Skirt Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 8 Ga.
App. 299, 300, 68 S.E. 1077, 1078 (1910) (same), afl'd, 12 Ga. App. 172, 77 S.E. 100 (1913);
Louisville Dry Goods v. Lanman, 135 Ky. 163, 167-68, 121 S.W. 1042, 1043 (1909) (pur-
chaser of goods on credit, lacking intent to pay, excepted from discharge in bankruptcy); cf.
In re Olsen, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 2 66,781, at 76,690 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1978) (debt incurred through issuance of checks drawn on insufficient funds dis-
chargeable where creditor failed to prove debtor did not intend to make them good when
issued); In re Marin, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 2 66,383, at 76,225
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1977) (same).
21 See, e.g., In re Nuttall, 201 F. 557, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (absent representation of
ability to pay, purchasing goods without intent to pay does not constitute obtaining prop-
erty by false pretenses or false representations). But cf. Zimmern v. Blount, 238 F. 740, 745
(5th Cir. 1917) (fraudulent declaration of stock dividend -implicitly constituted false
representation).
22 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941).
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debtor who, failing to disclose her insolvency, purchased goods
from the plaintiff on credit without any intention of paying for
them. Without specifically citing section 17(a)(2), the court re-
ferred to "settled law" that debts created by the fraud of the
debtor, in contrast to those incurred by an "actual overt false pre-
tense of representation," were not excepted from the discharge un-
less the debtor was acting as an officer or in a fiduciary capacity.3
Nonetheless, the Davison-Paxon court indicated that if fraud
had been the ground for denying discharge under section 17(a)(2),
rather than false pretenses or false representation, the plaintiff
would have prevailed. The court expressly acknowledged that "a
fraud may be committed in ways other than by the making of false
representations, "''  and characterized the debtor's conduct as
"false, deceitful and fraudulent."35 However, because the Act re-
ferred only to false pretenses and false representations, and not to
fraud, the court held that for the debt to be nondischargeable
under section 17(a)(2) the debtor must have made an overt misrep-
resentation or an overt false pretense; simply applying for credit
while insolvent was insufficient.3
In 1978, thirty-eight years after the Davison-Paxon decision,
the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") was enacted. Section
523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, replacing section 17(a)(2) of the Act, ex-
pressly excepts from discharge any debt "for money, property, [or]
services ... obtained by ... false pretenses, a false representation,
or actual fraud. '5 7  The Senate Report discussing section
523(a)(2)(A) underscores the importance of "actual fraud" as a
valid ground on which to deny discharge of a debt. It states that
"actual fraud" is an additional ground "for exception from dis-
charge."3 " In light of Congress' response to the case law interpret-
ing section 17(a)(2), the inclusion of the phrase "actual fraud"
" Id. at 191-92; see also Zimmern, 238 F. at 745 ("fraud 'by obtaining property by false
pretenses or false representations' . . . is the only kind of fraud that prevents the release of
[a] bankrupt from his provable debts") (citing Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 17(a)(2)).
" Davison-Paxon, 115 F.2d at 191.
35 Id.
3" Id. at 191-92; see also In re Nuttall, 201 F. 557, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (debt created by
fraud dischargeable unless false pretenses or representations made).
' See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
s3 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5864. "This provision is modified only slightly from current section
17(a)(2). First, 'actual fraud' is added as a ground for exception from discharge." Id.
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seems to preclude a discharge to a purported purchaser.39
2. Post-Code Developments
Although inconclusive, a number of legislative and case law
developments regarding section 523(a)(2)(A) support the notion
that the fraud exception was intended to apply even where a
debtor, such as a purported purchaser, makes no explicit factual
misrepresentation.
For instance, the legislative history of section 523(a)(2)(C), en-
acted in 1984, suggests that Congress' concern focused on the
moral culpability of the purported purchaser, not whether an ex-
press representation was made. The Senate Report, accompanying
a preliminary version of section 523(a)(2)(C), stated: "Section 523
is amended and expanded to address a type of unconscionable or
fraudulent debtor conduct not heretofore considered by the
Code."'40 Thus the report characterizes a purchase of goods in an-
ticipation of discharge due to bankruptcy as "unconscionable" and
"fraudulent," without indicating the need for the debtor to make
an express misrepresentation.
Nor does the language of section 523(a)(2)(C) require that an
express representation be made:
for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph [section
523(a)(2)], consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregat-
ing more than $500 for "luxury goods or services" incurred by an
individual debtor on or within forty days before the order for re-
lief under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than
$1,000 that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end
39 See Zaretsky, The Fraud Exception to Discharge Under the New Bankruptcy Code,
53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 253, 256-57 (1979). The statute has been so construed, however, primar-
ily in modern credit card cases. See, e.g., In re Dougherty, 84 Bankr. 653, 657 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1988) (credit card purchase without intent to pay is "actual fraud"); In re Blackburn,
68 Bankr. 870, 879 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987) (same); In re Doggett, 75 Bankr. 789, 792
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (same).
40 S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1983). This sentence might be construed as
suggesting that prior to section 523(a)(2)(C) the fraud exception did not apply to the pur-
ported purchaser paradigm at all. But such a reading would be incorrect. Section
523(a)(2)(C) does not extend the general provision of section 523(a)(2)(A) to a limited set of
purported purchasers. Instead, section 523(a)(2)(C) presupposes that section 523(a)(2)(A)
applies to all purchasers. The contribution of section 523(a)(2)(C) is to establish a rebutta-
ble presumption that debtors who incurred certain consumer debts right before the filing of
the bankruptcy petition were purported purchasers. The real meaning of this sentence in
the Senate Report seems to be that the Code had never before singled out the purported
purchaser phenomenon.
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credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within twenty
days before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to
be nondischargeable.4 '
Other purchases are similarly nondischargeable under the "actual
fraud" clause of section 523(a)(2)(A), provided that the creditor
proves that the debtor made the purchases without any intent to
pay.4
2
A number of courts have acknowledged that section
523(a)(2)(A) establishes an independent "actual fraud" standard.43
These courts have employed a liberal definition of fraud which
would include the conduct of a purported purchaser: "Actual fraud
... consists of any deceit, artifice, trick, or design involving direct
and active operation of the mind, used to circumvent and cheat
another-something said, done or omitted with the design of per-
petrating what is known to be a cheat or deception. '44 Thus, where
a debtor entered into a contract to repair a homeowner's kitchen,
without any intent to perform, she was found to have committed
actual fraud, and her obligation to return the deposit was
nondischargeable.45
Other cases have held that an implied misrepresentation is
enough to prevent a discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A), 46 reason-
ing that a debtor's active conduct or failure to disclose material
information gives rise to a false representation under section
523(a) (2) (A).47
! 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (1988); see also Resnicoff, Barring Bankruptcy Banditry:
Revision of Section 523(a) (2) (C), VII BANKR. DEV. J. (forthcoming 1990) (critical analysis of
provision).
42 See, e.g., In re Barger, 85 Bankr. 756, 760 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
" Blackburn, 68 Bankr. at 871; In re Burgstaler, 58 Bankr. 508, 515 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1986); In re Holston, 47 Bankr. 103, 108 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985); In re Yoder, 33 Bankr. 918,
920 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983); In re Simpson, 29 Bankr. 202, 209 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983);
In re Donald, 26 Bankr. 521, 523 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Fox, 13 Bankr. 827, 829
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 523.08[5] (L. King 15th ed. 1990).
'5 In re Fenninger, 49 Bankr. 307, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); see also In re Guy, 101
Bankr. 961, 979 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (actual fraud requires showing of material misrep-
resentation and scienter); In re Firestone, 26 Bankr. 706, 716-17 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982)
( romise to perform contractual obligations made with no intent to fulfill promise consti-
tutes actual fraud for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A)).
48 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
" The material nondisclosure is said to give rise to an affirmative misrepresentation.
See In re Van Horne, 823 F.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1987) (debt nondischargeable where
debtor obtained renewal of loan from mother-in-law without disclosing deteriorating rela-
tionship with spouse); In re Piercy, 96 Bankr. 953, 955 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989)
[Vol. 64:2:253
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C. Nonbankruptcy Law Analysis Favors an Expansive Defini-
tion of "Actual Fraud"
At common law, it was generally recognized that the purchase
of goods without the intent to pay constituted fraud, even absent
express misrepresentations.48 Therefore, under an "actual fraud"
test, debts incurred by purported purchasers would be nondis-
chargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A).
There are at least two distinct theories which explain why
debts so incurred amount to fraud. One theory, set forth in section
530 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, states that a "represen-
tation of the maker's own intention to do or not to do a particular
thing is fraudulent if he does not have that intention." 9 By con-
tracting to purchase goods the purported purchaser is deemed to
have impliedly misrepresented that she intends to pay for them. 0
Under the second theory, the purported purchaser commits
(§ 523(a)(2)(A) applies where debtor/vendor fails to disclose latent defects to creditor/ven-
dee); Fox, 13 Bankr. at 830 (debt nondischargeable where debtor failed to disclose another
person's forgery on note and mortgage); see also In re King, 68 Bankr. 569, 572 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1986) (debt dischargeable where creditor did not rely on debtor's "deceitful silence").
But cf. In re Smith, 81 Bankr. 888, 896 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) (no intentional nondisclo-
sure where husband filed chapter 7 petition months after divorce settlement). Unfortu-
nately, many courts continue to differentiate between implicit and explicit representations
and between the use of bad checks and credit card purchases. See infra notes 53, 60-61 and
accompanying text.
" See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530(1) (1977).
50 See id. at comment c.
c. Misrepresentation of intention to perform an agreement.
The rule stated in this Section [530] finds common application when the
maker misrepresents his intention to perform an agreement made with the recipi-
ent. The intention to perform the agreement may be expressed but it is normally
merely to be implied from the making of the agreement. Since a promise necessa-
rily carries with it the implied assertion of an intention to perform it follows that
a promise made without such an intention is fraudulent and actionable in deceit
under the rule stated in Section 525.
Id.; see also id. § 525 (liability for fraudulent misrepresentation); F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0.
GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS § 7.10, at 445-46 (2d ed. 1986) (law more prepared to recognize
potential materiality of expressions of intentions than opinions). See generally Keeton,
Fraud-Statements of Intention, 15 TEx. L. REv. 185, 186 (1937) (implied representation of
intent arises out of contractual promise); Note, The Legal Effect of Promises Made With
Intent Not to Perform, 38 CoLuMi. L. REv. 1461, 1461 (1938) (promise made with intent not
to perform constitutes actionable fraud); Note, Torts-Actionable Fraud-Promissory Rep-
resentations, 24 N.C.L. REv. 49, 50 (1945) (fraud may be predicated on promise made with
intention not to perform); Note, Fraud: Promises Made Without Intention to Perform, 2
OKLA. L. REv. 365, 366-67 (1949) (statute of frauds undisturbed by allowing plaintiff to
prove defendant's fraud).
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fraud by failing to disclose her intention not to pay. 1 Although
parties to a commercial transaction usually bear no affirmative
duty to divulge information to one another, there are certain well-
established exceptions. One exception applies to a party having
knowledge not reasonably available to the other party, knowing the
other is acting upon a mistaken belief. Silence in such a circum-
stance constitutes fraud.2
This theory would cover debts incurred by the purported pur-
chaser. Although the purported purchaser does not intend to pay,
this information is not reasonably available to the seller. As a re-
sult, the debtor has committed fraudulent nondisclosure.
In addition, where there is an initial truthful representation of
an intent to pay, such as when a debtor first enters into a credit
card contract with the issuer in good faith, there is a duty to advise
the issuer of any subsequent information which would make the
initial representation untrue or misleading.5 3 Where a purported
purchaser who initially dealt in good faith decides not to pay for
her purchases, she has knowledge of information that she knows
will make the initial representation untrue or misleading. Conse-
quently, the purported purchaser is obligated to disclose this infor-
mation to the seller; failure to do so constitutes fraud.
D. Other Code Provisions Interpret "Fraud" Broadly
The fact that "fraud" is interpreted broadly in other sections
of the Code to include deceptive conduct suggests that the term
should also be broadly interpreted in section 523(a)(2)(A) as well.
For example, section 548(a) deals with fraudulent transfers
made with the subjective intent "to hinder, delay, or defraud"
creditors.5 4 This section applies to transfers of ownership or secur-
ity interests in property.
In one case, In re Allied Development Corp.,55 a debtor bor-
rowed money from his attorney and executed a mortgage to secure
" See Reid v. Cowduroy, 79 Iowa 169, 172-73, 44 N.W. 351, 352 (1890); Oswego Starch
Factory v. Lendrum, 57 Iowa 573, 581, 10 N.W. 900, 905 (1881); Swift v. Rounds, 19 R.I. 527,
35 A. 45, 46 (1896).
52 See Reid, 79 Iowa at 172, 44 N.W. at 352.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c) (1977).
See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988). Section 548(b), in contrast, addresses transfers that
are "fraudulent" as to creditors based on objective criteria; and it is therefore irrelevant to
the purported purchaser paradigm. See id. § 548(b).
55 435 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1970).
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the loan.56 Afraid that other creditors would be provoked into col-
lection activity if they were to learn of the transaction, the debtor
persuaded his attorney to delay recording the mortgage. When fi-
nally recorded, the mortgage was undone as a fraudulent transfer.
The court held that the parties had defrauded the debtor's credi-
tors, although no false representation had been made.5"
More commonly, a subjectively fraudulent transfer involves a
debtor's conveyance of assets to friends or relatives for lower than
fair market value, usually without any misrepresentation whatso-
ever. The transferee is liable to the debtor's creditors for the dif-
ference between the fair market value and the actual value given.
For example, in Mackel v. Rochester,58 the court held that the
transferee's liability was incurred through fraud and was therefore
nondischargeable under an earlier version of section 523(a)(2)(A).59
Fraud also has been found where a debtor engaged in a check kit-
ing scheme, although there was no evidence that the scheme in-
volved any express misrepresentations.6 0
PART III: MISAPPLICATION OF SECTION 523(a)(2)(A)
Where purported purchasers make express misrepresentations,
courts have had little trouble finding that section 523(a)(2)(A) ap-
plies. However, where there are no such express misrepresenta-
tions, courts have had difficulty in deciding whether or not to ap-
ply section 523(a)(2)(A). Rather than acknowledge that the
purported purchaser's conduct is fraudulent, whether a bad check
or credit card is employed, most courts have focused on the device
used. This results in separate lines of cases with inconsistent
rulings."'
56 Id. at 373.
' Id. at 375-76. The facts of this case do not even give rise to an implied representation
because the court did not cite as essential any actual communication or communicative con-
duct between the debtor and his creditors.
11 135 F. 904 (D. Mont. 1905).
1" Id. at 908. Such conduct also has been characterized as sufficiently reprehensible to
warrant subordination of claims against a debtor. See In re Luby, 89 Bankr. 120, 126-27
(Bankr. D. Or. 1988) (dictum).
eo In re Paolino, 53 Bankr. 399, 402 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985), afl'd, 60 Bankr. 828 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa 1986); see also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
61 In bad check cases, preoccupation with the method of committing the fraud, for ex-
ample, the bad check, has caused a number of bankruptcy courts erroneously to find that
they are bound by one particular nonbankruptcy precedent, United States v. Williams, 458
U.S. 279 (1982), which reached the counterintuitive conclusion that passing a bad check
does not constitute even an implicit misrepresentation.
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A. Credit Card Cases
There are essentially two methods6 2 by which a purported pur-
chaser may obtain the use of a credit card: a debtor may simply
apply for a credit card or, alternatively, may receive an unsolicited
notification that she has been pre-approved for the card. Whether
or not she applied for the credit card, the debtor's initial intention
to accept or procure the card may be either honest or dishonest.
Optimally, the applicable legal standard regarding dischargeability
should be sufficiently flexible to respond to the ways in which
these situations differ, both conceptually and pragmatically.
Courts have adopted three different approaches under section
523(a)(2)(A): the implied misrepresentation approach, the assump-
tion of risk/reliance test, and the actual fraud standard." The ac-
tual fraud standard not only seems correct from the perspectives of
legislative history and statutory construction, but also offers the
greatest flexibility in dealing with the many purported purchaser
variations.
1. Implied Misrepresentation Approach
Most courts have focused on whether the debtor's use of the
credit card gave rise to an implied representation. The Davison-
Paxon ruling, that a "false representation" under section 17(a)(2)
of the Act must be made expressly for the debt to be nondischarge-
able, has been frequently and severely criticized;6 4 its validity
under section 523(a)(2)(A) also has been sharply questioned. Some
courts have opined that Davison-Paxon remains good law under
section 523(a)(2)(A) when a debtor- deals directly with a creditor,
but reject it in a three-party credit card context.6 5
62 Use of a stolen credit card would represent a third example that does not seem to
have been the subject of any reported decisions.
6" See First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927, 932 (11th Cir. 1983)
(adopting assumption of risk/reliance approach); see also supra note 42 and accompanying
text (actual fraud approach); supra note 30 and accompanying text (implied misrepresenta-
tion approach).
U See In re Poteet, 12 Bankr. 565, 568 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) ("[t]he Davison-Paxon
requirements are no longer relevant to the credit transactions of the type involved in this
case and are rejected"); Note, Recent Decisions, Bankruptcy-Debts Not Affected by a Dis-
charge-Goods Purchased When Insolvent With No Intent To Pay, 39 MICH. L. REv. 812,
813 (1941) ("[u]nder. . . [Davison-Paxon], an insolvent debtor may purchase goods with no
intent to pay for them, dissipate them in one last fling, and then be completely discharged
in bankruptcy of any liability to pay for them").
6" See Roddenberry, 701 F.2d at 932. For an example of a two-party transaction where
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Under the implied misrepresentation approach, most courts
have held that the user of a credit card impliedly represents that
she has the ability and intent to pay for a purchase. Thus, where
the implied representations are knowingly false, debts so incurred
are nondischargeable. These cases rely on the "false representa-
tion" language in section 523(a)(2)(A).
However, the implied misrepresentation theory has been criti-
cized because it denies a discharge to debts incurred by implied,
rather than actual, fraud. 6 There is considerable authority for the
proposition that actual fraud, not merely fraud implied by law,
must exist for a debt to be nondischargeable under section
523(a) (2) (A).67 Critics have complained that by recognizing implied
representation of the debtor's ability to pay, and then denying a
discharge because of the representation, courts have used the im-
plied misrepresentation theory as a disguised path to implied
fraud.
This criticism is misplaced. First, the criticism wrongly as-
sumes that the implied misrepresentation doctrine does not re-
quire proof of the debtor's fraudulent intent. In fact, however, in
addition to finding an implied misrepresentation of debtor's sol-
vency, these cases have required independent proof that the mis-
representation was made with actual fraudulent intent.6 8
Alternatively, the complaint erroneously ignores the distinc-
promises made with the intent to deceive were not deemed to be false representations under
section 523(a)(2)(A), see In re Simpson, 29 Bankr. 202, 205-07 (N.D. Iowa 1983) (debtor
borrowed from bank on alleged fraudulent promise to provide additional collateral and
promise held to be neither false representation nor actual fraud).
6 See In re Dougherty, 84 Bankr. 653, 656 (9th Cir. 1988) (implied representation the-
ory rejected because creditors must prove existence of representation by clear and convinc-
ing evidence); In re Blackburn, 68 Bankr. 870, 877 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987) (since creditor
must establish elements of actual fraud, implied representation theory rejected); In re Hol-
ston, 47 Bankr. 103, 108 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985) (implying false representation violates leg-
islative history of § 523(a)(2)(A)).
67 See In re Roberts, 82 Bankr. 179, 183 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (false pretense or false
representation must be made with intent to deceive or defraud); In re Burgstaler, 58 Bankr.
508, 512-14 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (passing of bad checks not necessarily indicative of
fraudulent intent). The same rule applied to earlier versions of section 523(a)(2)(A). See
Bullis v. O'Beirne, 195 U.S. 606, 615-17 (1904) (interpreting § 17 of Bankruptcy Act of
1898); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 706-09 (1877) (interpreting § 33 of Bankruptcy Act of
1867).
68 See Comerica Bank-Midwest v. Kouloumbris, 69 Bankr. 229, 230 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986) (nondischargeability requires implied representations to be materially false and made
with intent to deceive); In re Shrader, 55 Bankr. 608, 611 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985) (implied
representation needs actual intent to deceive).
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tion between implied fraud and implied misrepresentation. 9 Im-
plied fraud is insufficient because a discharge under section
523(a)(2)(A) is denied only to debts incurred through a debtor's
morally culpable conduct. Fraud implied by law, or constructive
fraud, may be committed without fraudulent intent; it should not
be a basis for a denial of discharge.70 The purported purchaser, in
contrast, intends to mislead creditors even though the misrepre-
sentation is implied. Such deliberate deceit is morally offensive
whether achieved impliedly or expressly.
Although the implied misrepresentation theory provides the
advantage of denying discharge to purported purchasers who work
their deception without any express misstatement, the theory is
conceptually faulty. As noted above, a representation may be im-
plied from the making of a contract because at that time one
makes a promise to perform.7 However, where a debtor applies for
and obtains a credit card without fraudulent intent, any represen-
tation implied by her making of the contract would not be fraudu-
lent and could not give rise to a section 523(a)(2)(A) exception.
When the debtor's intentions become fraudulent, the contract has
already been entered into and there seems to be no occasion to
infer a new representation.
Judge Merritt, writing for the dissent in In re Ward,7 2 has at-
tempted to explain the implied misrepresentation theory by argu-
ing that by issuing a credit card an issuer offers to form a number
of discrete, future contracts each time the cardholder uses the
card.73 Every time the card is used, the cardholder accepts the of-
09 See Zaretsky, supra note 39, at 257 (implied misrepresentations may render debt
nondischargeable).
'o See In re Kimzey, 761 F.2d 421, 423-24 (7th Cir. 1985) (creditor must prove debtor's
scienter); Gabellini v. Rega, 724 F.2d 579, 580-81 (7th Cir. 1984) (scienter required); In re
Gonzalez Seijo, 76 Bankr. 11, 13-14 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1987) (false representation must be
made with intent to deceive); In re Fordyce, 56 Bankr. 102, 104 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985)
(fraud implied in law insufficient without bad faith or immorality); In re Hunt, 30 Bankr.
425, 436 (D. Tenn. 1983) (actual fraud involving intentional wrongdoing or moral turpitude
required); In re Simpson, 29 Bankr. 202, 209 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (proof of actual fraud
requires showing moral turpitude or intentional wrong).
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 comment c (1977).
72 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 1086-87 (Merritt, J., dissenting). Judge Merritt cited several cases for this
proposition. Id.; see, e.g., Garber v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 104 Ill. App. 3d 675, 681, 432
N.E.2d 1309, 1311-12 (1982) (contract not formed upon issuance; separate contracts created
with each use of card); Novak v. Cities Service Oil Co., 149 N.J. Super. 542, 548-49, 374 A.2d
89,-92-93 (1977) (no contractual relationship created by mere issuance and receipt of credit
card), aff'd, 159 N.J. Super. 400, 388 A.2d 264 (1978). But even Novak indicated that if the
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fer and a new contract is formed. As part of the formation of each
subsequent contract the purchaser promises to perform, thereby
impliedly representing that she intends to perform. The creditor
relies on the promise to perform and on the implied statement of
intent.74
The principal problem with Judge Merritt's explanation is his
conceptualization of the issuer-holder relationship. There is au-
thority that a single contract is formed once either the credit card
is used or any annual fee is paid.75 Therefore, the only time the
purchaser makes any representation is at the time of contracting,
at which time her purpose may have been non-fraudulent.
Even if Judge Merritt is correct, and separate contracts are
made each time the debtor uses the credit card, the implied mis-
representation theory might prove inadequate. Whether through
speech or conduct, a misrepresentation affirmatively communicates
a false message to the creditor on which the creditor may detri-
mentally rely. In a credit card purchase, however, there is no such
communication; the issuer may not even learn of the debtor's con-
duct, i.e., the purchase, until after it is accomplished. Moreover,
cardholder gives consideration (e.g., an annual fee) for the original issuance of a card, a
contract for credit would be formed. Id. at 549, 374 A.2d at 92.
7' Ward, 857 F.2d at 1087 (Merritt, J., dissenting). Judge Merritt argued that unless
such reliance is assumed, the contract between the card issuer and the cardholder would be
voidable because the "exchange of consideration" necessary to formation of a contract
would be lacking. Id. at 1088. Without such reliance, there would not be the exchange of
consideration essential to formation of a contract; cardholders could avoid paying their
debts by developing a present intent not to pay. This could result in invalidation of billions
of dollars of credit debt. It is therefore necessary as a matter of policy to assume that issuers
do rely on the cardholder's implicit promise to pay. Id. at 1088-89. Judge Merritt's argu-
ment raises an interesting question as to whether contract reliance is necessarily identical to
tort reliance.
7 See Gray v. American Express Co., 743 F.2d 10, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1984); City Stores Co.
v. Henderson, 116 Ga. App. 114, 121, 156 S.E.2d 818, 823 (1967). Judge Merritt seems to
have misconstrued these cases in Ward as standing for the proposition that each use of the
credit card establishes a discrete contract. Actually, the cases indicated that the initial use
of a credit card establishes one contract which is terminable at will unless the terms of the
contract provide otherwise. See, e.g., City Stores, 116 Ga. App. at 121, 156 S.E.2d at 823
("[a]cceptance or use of the card by the offeree makes a contract between the parties ac-
cording to its terms, but we have seen none which prevents a termination of the arrange-
ment at any time by either party"); Novak, 149 N.J. Super. at 549, 374 A.2d at 92 (if debtor/
cardholder gave consideration, such as annual fee, binding contract would be formed); Bar-
ringer & Roberts, The Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984, Clarification or Further Confusion of
the Law of Credit Card Fraud?, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 449, 451 (1986) (cardholder's acceptance
constitutes contract). Consequently, if the cardholder had used the card once in good faith,
a binding credit agreement would be formed. But cf. Garber, 104 IM. App. 3d at 681, 432
N.E.2d at 1311-12 (contract formed each time card used).
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the issuer is not led to act because of any communication. The is-
suer's subsequent conduct in paying the retailer is not based on
any misimpression caused by the debtor's use of the card,76 but
rests on a separate contractual relationship between the issuer and
the retailer. 1
Application of the "false representation" theory to implied
representations engenders the same "implied fraud" problems dis-
cussed above. In addition, false representations cannot be based on
the issuer's subrogation rights. The credit card issuer primarily
represents to the retailer that it will pay the bill. The retailer does
not inquire into, nor can it meaningfully rely on, the purchaser's
financial circumstances. Provided that the credit card issuer will
pay, the retailer has not been fraudulently misled7 8 or harmed.
2. Assumption of Risk/Reliance Approach
Another approach first suggested by the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit in First National Bank of Mobile v. Rod-
denberry7 arose under section 17(a)(2) of the Act. The defendants,
Mr. and Mrs. Roddenberry, had obtained joint credit cards from
the plaintiff bank.80 When the defendants exceeded their credit
ceiling, the bank wrote to them on several occasions requesting
that no further charges be made.8 The Roddenberrys ignored the
written requests and made additional purchases.8 2 In response, the
bank's credit department official had a telephone conversation
with Mr. Roddenberry in which he promised to make no further
" Cf. Ward, 857 F.2d at 1083.
7 Judge Merritt argued that, as a matter of contract law, there must be reliance on the
implied promise to perform which is made at each use of the credit card. Id. at 1088-89. But
this reliance can itself be implied. Id. Judge Merritt offers no explanation why implied reli-
ance is sufficient for the purposes of section 523(a)(2)(A).
11 See First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Roddenberry, 701 F.2d 927, 931-32 (11th Cir.
1983). The Roddenberry court stated:
[Wihen Mrs. Roddenberry purchased merchandise she did not present herself to
her creditor, and arguably took affirmative steps to avoid such a confrontation.
Moreover, the merchants with whom.., she had direct contact had no incentive
to perform a credit card check because they were assured payment from the bank
so long as the charge was less than $50.00. Indeed, to have performed a credit
check would have resulted in a lost sale.
Id. at 931.
79 701 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1983).
80 Id. at 928.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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charges.8 3 Nevertheless, when the defendants separated, Mrs. Rod-
denberry went on a credit card spending spree, compelling the
plaintiff to program its automatic teller machines to retain the
cards if they were used for a cash advance."4 It also notified the
retailers to withhold the cards if any attempts were made to use
them for a purchase. 5 However, because retailers were only re-
quired to obtain authorization for purchases exceeding fifty dol-
lars, Mrs. Roddenberry was able to make many additional credit
purchases before her card was seized. 8
The Roddenberry court presupposed that the use of a credit
card could constitute an implied representation. However, a credit
card issuer does voluntarily enter into a relationship with the
debtor, and takes the risk of nonpayment into consideration when
it determines its schedule of finance charges. The Roddenberry
court, therefore, held that the issuer's rights under section
523(a)(2)(A) should be restricted.7 Specifically, the court declared
that credit card issuers generally assume the risk of debtor non-
payment, but only to the extent that the issuer's notification un-
equivocally and unconditionally revoked the cardholder's right to
possess and use the credit card. 8 Debts incurred prior to notifica-
tion are dischargeable.8 ' If a cardholder uses the card after receiv-
83 Id.
84 Id.
8I Id.
8 Id. at 928-29.
17 Id. at 932. "Banks are willing to risk non-payment of debts because that risk is fac-
tored into the finance charges. Because the risk is voluntary and calculated, section 17(a)(2)
should not be construed to afford additional protection for those who unwisely permit or
encourage debtors to exceed their credit limits." Id. (discussing Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
88 Id. Some courts construe Roddenberry as holding that use of a credit card does not
implicitly represent an intent or ability to pay, or, alternatively, that an implicit representa-
tion is insufficient to satisfy the "false pretenses or false representation" language of section
523(a)(2)(A). See, e.g., In re Dougherty, 84 Bankr. 653, 656 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988) (notion
that cardholder makes misrepresentation only upon continued use of card after notice of
issuer's revocation is minority view); In re Carpenter, 53 Bankr. 724, 728-29 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1985) (court declined to follow implied representation analysis, stating bank bears risk
of default). Nevertheless, this view seems to be erroneous. The Roddenberry court based its
decision to discharge pre-revocation debts on the assumption of risk theory. Roddenberry,
701 F.2d at 928. If use of the credit card did not give rise to an implicit misrepresentation
under section 523(a)(2)(A), the Roddenberry court could have discharged pre-revocation
debts without introducing assumption of risk analysis. In addition, Roddenberry specifically
relied on the implied representation theory. Id. at 932. The court held that post-revocation
debts were nondischargeable because of the debtor's implicit representation "that [she] is
entitled to possess and use the card." Id.
1 Roddenberry, 701 F.2d at 932 ("[d]ebts arising prior to the communication of revoca-
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ing such notice, the cardholder is said to make "an affirmative mis-
representation that . . . [she] is entitled to possess and use the
card."90 These debts are nondischargeable.91
"Assumption of risk" is a concept which is usually raised by a
tort defendant as a shield against liability for negligence.92 . It may
not be used to defend against intentional wrongdoing, such as
fraud. 3 Moreover, it is illogical to hold that an issuer should be
barred from bringing suit to recover an unpaid sum because it as-
sumed the risk of nonpayment; this view allows one to refuse to
pay with impunity.
Even if an assumption of risk analysis were applicable theoret-
ically, Roddenberry provides no convincing basis for ruling that
credit card issuers assume the risk of fraud or nonpayment.
Rather, the Roddenberry court reasoned that an issuer's account-
ing for the risk of nonpayment in determining finance charges
should protect the purchaser.94 This argument is clearly unsound.
All profit-maximizing companies attempt to estimate prospective
business losses, including those arising from potential intentional
wrongdoing, as a part of the cost of doing business. This practice
should not, however, prevent a creditor from seeking reimburse-
ment from a wrongdoer."'
Even if the Roddenberry court had reasoned that credit card
issuers cannot reasonably rely on the implied representations
which the cardholders may make, such an argument would have
tion are part of the risk assumed by the bank").
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1977).
1 See generally, W. PROSSER, R. KEETON, D. DOBBS & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS 108 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing defense to intentional tort, excluding assumption of
risk).
" See Roddenberry, 701 F.2d at 932. Some credit card issuers encourage their card-
holders to exceed their credit limit. Id. There is, however, no evidence that such encourage-
ment extends to inducing cardholders to make purchases without an intent to pay. Id. Con-
sequently, the "encouragement" argument referred to in Roddenberry is unhelpful.
95 Credit card issuers presumably realize the risk of defalcation by employees who han-
dle checks and cash as one of their duties. Nevertheless, issuers "voluntarily" hire employ-
ees and assign them tasks which include handling checks and cash. The risk of embezzle-
ment is calculated into the finance charges. Should a dishonest employee be protected from
liability because the company "assumed the risk"?
Likewise, a retailer who encourages customers to enter the store and examine merchan-
dise must be aware that some of the customers may shoplift. The retailer presumably takes
this into account in determining prices. A shoplifter, however, would not be entitled to use
assumption of risk to defend against prosecution.
[Vol. 64:2:253
DISCHARGEABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY
been equally unpersuasive. In determining whether a party was de-
frauded, courts often ask whether the party reasonably relied on
the deceptive message conveyed to it."' A "reasonable reliance"
test has two parts; it first determines whether there was reliance,
and then determines whether the reliance was reasonable.97 If the
cardholder's representation arises before the card's misuse,9 the
issuer can reasonably rely on the representation and either issue
the credit card or fail to take steps to close the account."
None of the facts in Roddenberry suggest that the issuer's reli-
ance on the debtors' initial representation was unreasonable."'
There was no evidence that the issuer failed to perform a credit
check. Further, nothing in the debtors' credit history indicated
that the Roddenberrys were a poor credit risk. Instead, Rod-
denberry involved an unanticipated break-up of the debtors' mar-
riage which resulted in one of the debtors abusing her credit privi-
leges.1"' Although she knew that she had exceeded her credit limit,
this co-debtor engaged in a series of purchases deliberately below
the price limit which would have required a credit check. 02 The
facts in Roddenberry simply provide no justification for question-
91 See In re Mullet, 817 F.2d 677, 680 (10th Cir. 1987); In re Hunter 780 F.2d 1577,
1579 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Kimzey, 761 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1985).
'7 See Mullet, 817 F.2d at 680.
"I The representation can arise from the cardholder's implied or express statement in
her initial credit application, previous proper use of the card, or payment of an earlier ac-
count statement.
91 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToaRTs § 551(c) (1977) (failure to disclose change in
intent treated as continuous representation upon which issuer can rely).
10o See Roddenberry, 701 F.2d at 927, 928-29 (11th Cir. 1983). After the original exten-
sion of credit, the debtors' credit limit was raised twice. Id. at 928. The first increase was
granted automatically by the issuer to all of its cardholders who were in good standing. Id.
The second increase was granted in May 1978, at the debtors' request. Id. An argument
could be made that the issuer's reliance on the debtors' continuing representation was un-
reasonable at the time of the second increase.
Yet, there are at least two reasons to reject this argument. First, the credit card initially
was issued in November 1975. Id. The court did note that in the approximately two and
one-half years prior to May 1978, the issuer had not experienced any serious problems with
the debtors' account. Id. In light of this credit history, the issuer's reliance may not be
unreasonable. See id.
More importantly, the Roddenberry court focused on the reliance in issuing the credit
card in November 1975. See id. Once the credit card was issued, the debtor was in a position
to engage in her fraudulent and deceptive series of purchases. Id. The increase in the credit
limit in no way assisted the debtor in her scheme. Id. Indeed, despite the increase, the
debtors exceeded their credit limit at all times. Id. As early as May 1978, the issuer wrote to
the debtors and requested that the excess account balance be eliminated. Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 928-29.
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ing the reasonableness of the card issuer's reliance at the time of
issuance.
Additionally, there is no theoretical basis for characterizing as
unreasonable a card issuer's reliance on a debtor's initial intent to
pay. The vast majority of debtors presumably intend to pay, and,
indeed, most do.
A reasonable reliance approach does not adequately justify
different treatment for pre-revocation and post-revocation debt.
The creditor's reliance is no more reasonable after the debtor re-
ceives notification that the right to use or possess the card is re-
voked than before. The creditor does not act in reliance on any
representation. Rather, the creditor is simply trying to prevent the
debtor from making any new purchases. Reliance at this point in
time, therefore, plays no part in the issuer's conduct.
The Roddenberry opinion was inconclusive as to whether sec-
tion 523(a)(2) (A) treats a credit card issuer differently from section
17(a)(2) of the Act.' Subsequent cases have reached variant re-
sults. Some courts have held that Roddenberry does apply to sec-
tion 523(a)(2)(A) and, therefore, credit card debts incurred before
the issuer unambiguously revokes the customer's credit card privi-
leges are dischargeable. 10 4 Others courts have rejected Rod-
103 Id. at 929 n.3.
Although ... [Section 523(a)(2)(A)] is substantially identical to section 17(a)
Congress has incorporated certain modifications which may alter the outcome
in certain cases where debtors obtain credit without a present intention of repay-
ment (citation omitted). Indeed, one commentator suggests that Congress' addi-
tion of the term "actual fraud" to the "false pretenses and false representation"
language of section 17(a) was intended to eliminate the distinction between overt
and implied misrepresentation drawn in Davison-Paxon (citation omitted). At this
time, we express no opinion with respect to this construction of section 523
(a)(2)(A).
Id. Some of the post-Roddenberry cases remark that section 17(a)(2) was not materially
changed by 523(a)(2)(A). See Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. Case, 755 F.2d 1474, 1476
(11th Cir. 1985) (discussing differences between § 523(a)(2)(A) and predecessor); In re Dog-
gett, 75 Bankr. 789, 791 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (agreeing with Eleventh Circuit decision
holding that due to little differences between §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and 17(a)(2), case law constru-
ing one provides useful guideline for applying other); In re Wilson, 32 Bankr. 772, 774 n.4
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (noting that § 523(a)(2)(A) is modified only slightly from
§ 17(a)(2)).
10 See In re Landen, 95 Bankr. 826, 828 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Moore, 88
Bankr. 385, 386 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). Some courts apply the Roddenberry holding only
when no clear evidence exists that the debtor had no intention to pay. See, e.g., In re
Shrader, 55 Bankr. 608, 612 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985) (adhering to Roddenberry, court con-
cluded that voluntary assumption of risk on part of bank continues until unequivocal and
unconditional revocation occurs).
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denberry to the extent that it restricts denials of discharges to pur-
ported purchasers under section 523(a)(2)(A). 105 The latter courts
relied on either the implied representation or actual fraud theo-
ries.1"6 A third approach is to apply the Roddenberry analysis
where a creditor has failed to perform even a minimal credit inves-
tigation before issuing the card.107 Under this approach, to be eligi-
ble for section 523(a)(2)(A) protection, a creditor must make a spe-
cific inquiry regarding each applicant.10 8 This alternative approach
finds support in cases under section 523(a)(3)(B) which hold that a
creditor must have performed some type of credit check in order to
prevent a discharge; otherwise, the debt is deemed not to have
been incurred through the making of a false written statement re-
garding the debtor's financial condition.0 9
105 See In re Hall, 101 Bankr. 781, 784 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (debtor's obligations
nondischargeable because of knowledge of his inability to meet them); In re Senty, 42
Bankr. 456, 461 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejects precedent to nondischarge); In re Bono, 41
Bankr. 629, 631 n.1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (rejects Roddenberry holding that concealment
of insolvency does not constitute fraudulent misrepresentation); see also In re Wilson, 32
Bankr. 772, 776 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (rejects Roddenberry as not controlling, stating
that to hold all purchases prior to revocation dischargeable per se goes too far). These
courts, however, do not hesitate to apply Roddenberry to deny discharge of debts incurred
after notice of revocation was sent to cardholder. See, e.g., In re Solano, 85 Bankr. 642, 643
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (charges incurred subsequent to date revocation letter sent excepted
from discharge despite claim letter never received); In re Fisher, 74 Bankr. 633, 635 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1987) (finding all post-revocation charges nondischargeable).
106 See Solano, 85 Bankr. at 643; Fisher, 74 Bankr. at 635; Bono, 41 Bankr. at 631.
1'0 See, e.g., In re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082, 1084 (6th Cir. 1988) (credit card debt held
dischargeable since there was no evidence of even minimal credit check); In re Mullet, 817
F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1987) (where minimal investigation would have disclosed falsity of
representation, debt is discharged if no investigation performed); In re Mitchell, 70 Bankr.
524, 528 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) ("commercial lenders ... are required to conduct a commer-
cially reasonable investigation of the information supplied by the debtor").
106 See Mullet, 817 F.2d at 680; In re Carpenter, 53 Bankr. 724, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1983).
106 Ward, 857 F.2d at 1084 n.2. The Ward court's reliance on section 523(a)(2)(B)(iii),
however, may be misplaced; section 523(a)(2)(B)(iii), unlike section 523(a)(2)(A), specifically
refers to a debtor's use of a writing "on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for
such money, property, services or credit reasonably relied." Id. See 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1988). Reasonable reliance, like the requirement that the statement be in
writing, may be a special requirement under section 523(a)(2)(B).
Relief may be granted more restrictively under section,523(a)(2)(B) than under section
523(a)(2)(A) because of a fear that creditors otherwise might employ unreasonable methods
to encourage applicants to complete financial statements accurately. Thus, creditors could
protect themselves from a discharge because they unofficially obtain information sufficient
to approve the loan. See Note, supra note 3, at 907-08. In addition, many applicants are too
unsophisticated to submit completely accurate financial information. This information, if
not supported by at least a cursory credit check, may be unreliable even when the applicant
acts in good faith.
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3. The Actual Fraud Approach
A third line of cases has recognized that actual fraud itself is
an independent ground for denying discharge under section
523(a)(2)(A)." 0 One of the first cases to adopt this position was In
re Holston."' The Holston court distinguished the ruling in
Davison-Paxon by focusing on the language of section
523(a)(2)(A):
The addition of "actual fraud" in the new statute [section
523(a)(2)(A)], however, expands the scope of non-dischargeable
debts to include those that arise from acts or omissions that are
intentionally or consciously used to deceive or to trick another; an
overt act is not necessary to actual fraud because an intentional
or conscious omission can constitute fraud."'
The Holston case concerned credit card debts incurred after
the card issuer had informed the debtor that the account had been
closed."' The court found that by subsequent use of the credit
card, the debtors led the retailers to believe that the account was
in good standing." 4 The debtors received the purchased goods and
services knowing that the merchants delivered the goods and
services based on this false belief. 1 5 The court held that this con-
duct constituted actual fraud; the debts, therefore, were nondis-
chargeable." 6
The issue of whether section 523(a)(2)(B) requires creditor reliance remains unsettled.
Compare Mullet, 817 F.2d at 679 (reliance must be reasonable) with In re Ophaug, 827 F.2d
340, 343 (8th Cir. 1987) (reliance need not be reasonable); see also In re Showalter, 86
Bankr. 877, 881 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (asserting that Ophaug requirement of establishing
only reliance should be confined to noncommercial creditors).
This debate involves a conflict between competing policies. Some cases suggest that
equity requires that a creditor should not be barred from seeking payment from a purpose-
fully fraudulent debtor. See In re Wilson, 12 Bankr. 363, 369-70 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
Others argue that society would benefit from the discharge of debts incurred after a credi-
tor's inadequate credit check. See In re Hagedorn, 25 Bankr. 666, 669 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982); see also Note, supra note 3, at 907 ("it is inequitable to reward a possibly imprudent
creditor who failed to detect the debtor's misrepresentation"). This rule would encourage
creditors to perform more thorough credit checks and reduce the incidence of fraudulently
incurred debts.
1 See Carpenter, 53 Bankr. at 279; In re Wilson, 32 Bankr. 772, 776 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1983).
47 Bankr. 103 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
112 Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
"' Id. at 105.
114 Id. at 106.
115 Id.
.. Id. Given the facts of that case, the same result would have been obtained under the
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In re Carpentern 7 also adopted the actual fraud standard.11 s
There the plaintiff alleged that the debtor had made purchases
while insolvent and without any intention to pay.119 The Carpenter
court followed Roddenberry, finding that the alleged conduct did
not constitute a false pretense or false representation. 120 Neverthe-
less, the court asserted that section 523(a)(2)(A) establishes an ac-
tual fraud test; it maintained that where a debtor makes credit
card purchases with no intent to repay the debt, the debtor has
committed actual fraud and, thus, the debt is nondischargeable. 121
The actual fraud approach had been adopted in a number of
non-credit card cases before and after Holston.122 This standard is
preferable to the implied representation theory because it is both
analytically sound and sufficiently flexible. As explained in Part II
of this Article, the fraud could be found either in the debtor's over-
all course of conduct or in her failure to disclose "subsequently ac-
quired information. '123 The debtor's subsequent intent not to pay
makes the initial promise to pay, made when the credit contract
was formed, untrue or misleading.124
B. Bad Check Cases
With respect to checks, a purported purchaser is one who is-
sues a check to obtain goods or services knowing that it will be
dishonored by the bank.125 Moreover, the purported purchaser has
no intent to offer alternative payment in the event of that dis-
honor.1 26 Issuance of the check is an integral element of formation
Roddenberry rationale. Interestingly, however, the court did not discuss whether the
merchants were affected by the outcome of the case. See id.
11 53 Bankr. 724 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985).
118 Id. at 729.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. The court said that to hold otherwise would be to ignore the plain language of
the statute. Id. Nonetheless, the debt was held dischargeable because the plaintiff failed to
carry his burden of proof. Id. at 731.
122 See In re Ducharme, 85 Bankr. 640, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (failure to repay
loan); In re Carneal, 33 Bankr. 922, 925 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) (same).
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
12 Id. § 551(c) comment h.
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1988). This section does not apply to the issuance of
bad checks used to satisfy previously incurred debts; there must be fraudulent intent at the
time the debt is created. Id.
126 The debtor may know there are insufficient funds or, if there are funds, the debtor
may plan to remove the funds or close the account before the check is presented. See, e.g.,
In re Fitzgerald, 109 Bankr. 893, 894 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (debtor not only removed
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of the debtor's purchase contract and should give rise to an im-
plicit representation of the drawee bank's intent to honor the
check. 2 7 Indeed, under the rule enunciated in Ames v. Moir,2 ' the
debtor's receipt of goods purchased with the intent not to pay
should itself constitute fraud, even if no check were issued.
Bad check cases, however, have applied extensively some form
of the implied misrepresentation paradigm. 2 ' Most courts found
that issuance of the check constituted some representation which,
at least if supported by evidence of fraudulent intent, would result
in a determination of nondischargeability under section 523(a)
(2)(A).3 0 Misapplying nonbankruptcy precedent, some courts have
funds from account, but also stopped payment on the check).
117 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 comment c (1977).
128 138 U.S. 306 (1891).
129 See In re Kurdoghlian, 30 Bankr. 500, 502 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (issuance of checks
is implicit representation that checks are good); In re Horwitz, 100 Bankr. 395, 398 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989) (issuance of checks alone does not constitute false representations under §
523(a)(2)(A)); In re Tuggle, 86 Bankr. 612, 615 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (issuance of dishon-
ored check without more not actionable representation under § 523(a)(2)(A)); In re Lewsad-
der, 84 Bankr. 711, 714 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1988) (tender of check is implicit representation of
sufficient funds); In re Hunter, 83 Bankr. 803, 804 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (for purposes of §
523(a)(2)(A), issuance of check not representation that it will be honored); In re Gonzalez
Seijo, 76 Bankr. 11, 13-14 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1987) (after citing § 523 (a)(2)(A) requirement
that there be "representation," court found debtor issuing postdated check had promised to
pay at future date but debt nonetheless dischargeable because no fraudulent intent); In re
Boyer, 62 Bankr. 648, 649 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986) (after identifying § 523 (a)(2)(A) require-
ment that debtor make representation, court found that debt incurred through issuance of
bad check was dischargeable because debtor lacked fraudulent intent); In re Pokrandt, 54
Bankr. 691, 692 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (issuance of insufficient funds check to fraudu-
lently obtain merchandise would be misrepresentation under § 523(a)(2)(A)); In re Mullin,
51 Bankr. 377, 378 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985) (issuance of check carries implied representation
of sufficient available funds); In re Hammett, 49 Bankr. 533, 535 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985)
(issuance of check does not constitute § 523(a)(2)(A) representation); In re Anderson, 10
Bankr. 296, 297 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981) (issuance of check is implied representation of
available funds). But see In re Ethridge, 80 Bankr. 581, 587 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) (section
523(a)(2)(A) establishes three grounds for nondischargeability; thus actual fraud recognized
as separate ground).
130 See Kurdoghlian, 30 Bankr. at 502 (issuance of check with knowledge of insufficient
funds is fraudulent misrepresentation under § 523(a)(2)(A)); Lewsadder, 84 Bankr. at 716
(tender of bad check in reckless disregard of truth sufficient to amount to false representa-
tion under § 523(a)(2)(A)); Gonzalez Seijo, 76 Bankr. at 13-14 (delivery of check with fraud-
ulent intent would satisfy representation requirement); Boyer, 62 Bankr. at 649 (delivery of
check with fraudulent intent is § 523(a)(2)(A) misrepresentation); Pokrandt, 54 Bankr. at
692 (issuance of check with intent to defraud is § 523 (a)(2)(A) misrepresentation);.Mullin,
51 Bankr. at 377 (if debtor knew funds were insufficient, debtor's implied representation
that check is good is fraudulent); cf. In re Burgstaler, 58 Bankr. 508, 514 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1986) (even if issuance of check were § 523(a)(2)(A) representation, there must be proof
debtor did not intend to make checks good).
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recently concluded that issuance of a check does not constitute an
implied representation; instead, they have found the purported
purchaser's debts dischargeable, despite the debtor's intent not to
pay.13
1
In cases involving the issuance of bad checks, the application
of the implied misrepresentation theory differs from that previ-
ously discussed.132 This section will briefly review this version of
the theory and then examine the impact of the nonbankruptcy
precedent which has been used in bad check cases.
1. Implied Misrepresentation Approach
In the great majority of bad check cases courts have applied
the same implied misrepresentation analysis used in connection
with credit card debts. 33 In other words, the debtor's issuance of a
check impliedly represents that she has both the ability and the
intent to pay for the items or services purchased. The debtor does
not represent that she definitely has sufficient funds in her account
to cover the check."" Consequently, even if the debtor issues a
check knowing that there are insufficient funds to cover it, the
debt may be dischargeable. 3 5 Very few cases, however, have held
that when the debtor issues a check she impliedly represents that
there is enough money in her account to cover it. 36
' See Horwitz, 100 Bankr. at 398 (issuance of check not § 523(a)(2)(A) representa-
tion); Tuggle, 86 Bankr. at 614 (delivery of check not representation that check will be
honored); Hunter, 83 Bankr. at 804 (issuance of check not § 523(a)(2)(A) representation
that check is good); In re Jenkins, 61 Bankr. 30, 39 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) (issuance of checks
not representation that checks will be honored); In re Hunt, 30 Bankr. 425, 437-38 (M.D.
Tenn. 1983) (delivery of check without more not false representation under § 523(a)(2)(A));
cf. Hammett, 49 Bankr. at 534-35 (Williams.not limited to criminal prosecution).
12 See supra text accompanying notes 62-121.
133 See cases cited supra note 130.
"' See, e.g., Pokrandt, 54 Bankr. at 692 (knowing issuance of check on insufficient
funds does not establish misrepresentation); In re Sutton, 39 Bankr. 390, 397 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1984) (mere fact that debtor knowingly writes check on insufficient funds does not
establish misrepresentation); Hunt, 30 Bankr. at 442 (issuance of check on insufficient funds
not by itself proof of intent).
135 See Gonzalez Seijo, 76 Bankr. at 14; Hunt, 30 Bankr. at 452.
1386 See In re Kurdoghlian, 30 Bankr. 500, 502 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (tendering check is
implicit representation it will be honored); In re Mullin, 51 Bankr. 377, 378-79 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 1985) (inference of fraudulent intent allowed under state statute); In re Tabers, 28
Bankr. 679, 680 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (same); In re Anderson, 10 Bankr. 296, 297 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1981) (same).
A similar issue could have arisen in the credit card context. Use of a credit card may
have been found to be an implied representation that the purchase did not exceed the
debtor's credit limit. Nevertheless, this argument does not seem to have been adopted by
1990]
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Nevertheless, the practical difference between these two ap-
proaches may be limited. The cases which find that no representa-
tion is made as to the sufficiency of funds in the debtor's account
upon issuance of a check might declare a debt nondischargeable if
the debtor had issued the check to defraud the creditor. 137 The
cases finding a specific representation as to the sufficiency of funds
would declare the debt dischargeable only to the extent that the
debtor did not know the representation was false. 38 The only sig-
nificant difference between the two approaches arises where the
debtor knew that her check was drawn on insufficient funds but
anticipated future income to make the check "good."
2. The Williams Case
Williams v. United States'39 involved a criminal prosecution
for knowingly making a "false statement or report" for the purpose
of influencing action of certain federally insured banks. 140 The de-
fendant had engaged in "check kiting" between his accounts in
several federally insured banks.' 4 ' He knowingly drew checks for
amounts in excess of his account balance at one bank to deposit
them in the other, then reversed the process. 42 This reversal was
timed to prevent the checks from being returned for insufficient
funds.'43 The purpose of the scheme was to obtain the interest-free
use of money provisionally credited at each account, although no
funds had actually been deposited. 4 4
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the defendant's conduct did not constitute the making
of a "false statement.' 4 The issuance of a check was deemed not
to be "any representation as to the state of petitioner's bank bal-
ance." 4 Instead, it was considered merely the defendant's engage-
ment that upon dishonor of the check he would give the payee the
the courts.
"I See In re Boyer, 62 Bankr. 648, 649 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986).
138 See Kurdoghlian, 30 Bankr. at 501; Tabers, 28 Bankr. at 681; Anderson, 10 Bankr.
at 297.
139 458 U.S. 279 (1982).
14 Id. at 282.
141 Id. at 281.
142 Id. at 281-82.
113 Id. at 282.
144 Id. at 281 n.1.
15 Id. at 284.
148 Id. at 285.
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amount of the drawn check. 147
A number of bankruptcy court decisions have recently demon-
strated the application of Williams to section 523(a)(2)(A) .145
Courts have construed Williams to stand for the rule that knowing
issuance of a check on insufficient funds does not constitute a false
representation.149 Therefore, the issuance of such a check by a pur-
ported purchaser cannot satisfy the "false representation" test of
section 523(a)(2)(A). Williams has been applied even when the
debtor had no intention to pay for the goods for which she drew
the check.
Williams is distinguishable on at least six bases from the im-
plied misrepresentation theory. 150 First, the Williams Court never
concluded that the defendant's conduct was not fraudulent. On the
contrary, the Court tacitly admitted that Williams' conduct may
have been fraudulent, but held that the fraud fell outside the scope
of criminal prosecution.1 51 The Court emphasized that the indict-
ment did not charge the defendant with engaging in a fraudulent
scheme to obtain credit, but merely referred to the specific acts of
depositing individual checks when there were insufficient funds. 52
The relevant statute did not apply expressly to fraud. 53 In narrow-
ing the breadth of the statute so that it did not apply to the de-
fendant's conduct, the Court determined that a federal law against
fraudulent checking activities was unnecessary: "Federal action
was not necessary to interdict the deposit of bad checks, for, as
147 Id.
"I See In re Horwitz, 100 Bankr. 395, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (debtor's issuance of
checks, without more, does not constitute false representation under Code); In re Tuggle, 86
Bankr. 612, 614 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (same); In re Hunter, 83 Bankr. 803, 804 (M.D. Fla.
1988) (delivery of check not representation check will be honored); In re Jenkins, 61 Bankr.
30, 39 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) (same); In re Hammett, 49 Bankr. 533, 534-35 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1985) (Williams decision not limited to criminal prosecution); In re Hunt, 30 Bankr.
425, 437-38 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (checks drawn do not make representation as to debtor's
bank balance).
" See cases cited supra note 147.
110 See In re Roberts, 82 Bankr. 179, 182-83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (discussing some of
these distinctions). Under even the most expansive interpretation, Williams would only
limit the bad check cases which were most protective of the creditor by holding that issu-
ance of a check gave rise to an implied representation that the debtor had sufficient funds in
his account. But Williams in no way refuted the notion that the issuance of a check gives
rise to an implied representation that the debtor intends to make sure the check is honored.
See Williams, 458 U.S. at 279.
"' See Williams, 458 U.S. at 287.
11 Id.
Il Id. at 286-87; see 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988).
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Congress surely knew, fraudulent checking activities already were
addressed in comprehensive fashion by state law.' 1 54 The under-
pinnings of this argument indicates that the defendant in Williams
had, in fact, committed fraud. Similarly, where a purported pur-
chaser incurs debt for goods and services by issuing a check, the
debt might be nondischargeable in light of the actual fraud lan-
guage of section 523(a)(2)(A).
Second, the rules of statutory construction require that crimi-
nal statutes be interpreted narrowly.'55 Liberal application of a
criminal law would endanger personal liberty, as well as economic
independence. Although exceptions to bankruptcy discharge are
generally not broadly construed,5 6 this policy seems less compel-
ling than that regarding a criminal statute. However, according to
some courts, once a debtor's dishonesty has been proved, there is
no longer any public policy favoring a restrictive reading of excep-
tions to discharge. 57 A purported purchaser is, by definition, a dis-
honest debtor.
Third, the language of the statute in Williams provided spe-
cial guidance for its construction; 58 it proscribed the making of a
"false statement,' ' 5 9 not a false "representation." In some con-
texts, a distinction has been made between the word "statement"
and the word "representation.' 60 The word "statement," for in-
"' Williams, 458 U.S. at 287 (emphasis added).
"' Id. at 290.
See, e.g., In re Blackburn, 68 Bankr. 870, 875 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987) (exceptions to
rule of dischargeability of debts to be strictly construed); In re Faulk, 69 Bankr. 743, 748
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (same).
157 See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Flanagan, 28 F. Supp. 415, 419 (S.D. Ohio
1939) (construction of 1898 Bankruptcy Act prevents discharge of liability caused by
debtor's fraudulent conduct); see also In re Hunter, 771 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1988)
(objectives of bankruptcy law of permitting debtor fresh start are applicable only to honest
debtors). The Hunter court stated:
Different considerations apply once a creditor has carried the burden of showing
that a debt falls within the fraud exception to discharge and, therefore, has
demonstrated the debtor's dishonesty as to that debt. When dishonesty is demon-
strated with respect to a specific debt, "the debtor is no longer entitled to the
benefit of debtor rehabilitation policy considerations."
Id. (quoting In re Wilson, 12 Bankr. 363, 370 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981)).
i8 Williams, 458 U.S. at 286. The Court felt that any linguistic ambiguity in the con-
text of a criminal case should be resolved in favor of the defendant. Id.
'19 Id. The court focused on the word "statement," commenting that "[iln any event,
whatever the general understanding of a check's function, 'false statement' is not a term
that, in common usage, is often applied to characterize 'bad checks.'" Id.
160 See Obrist v. Christensen, 337 F.2d 220, 220 (9th Cir. 1964) (check is not financial
statement); Richland Farm Bureau v. Durbin, 8 Ohio App. 2d 312, 313, 222 N.E.2d 315, 317
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stance, may apply only to written representations, while "represen-
tation" may apply to both written and oral assertions. Such a dis-
tinction seems implicit in section 523(a) of the Code. For example,
section 523(a)(2)(A) refers to a false "representation," while sec-
tion 523(a)(2)(B) refers to "use of a statement in writing.' '16 1
"Statement," therefore, under the statute, may be an express com-
munication, while a "representation" or "pretense" may be one
that is implied."6 2
Fourth, even if there were no difference between the terms
"statement" and "representation," the unique factual setting of
Williams made it more difficult for the Court to conclude that the
defendant had made an intentionally false statement. Ultimately,
the Court construed the defendant's conduct as conveying
messages which were either true or at least not intentionally
false. 63  The check-kiting scheme in Williams involved no
purchases; the defendant made no implied promise to pay for any-
thing. Although the issuance of a check, as a miatter of law, consti-
tutes a promise to pay if the check is dishonored,' the Williams
defendant, relying on the timing of his deposits, did not expect
that any of his checks would be dishonored. 65 Moreover, even if
one of the checks had been dishonored, the check arguably could
have been "good" if the bank could debit the defendant's account.
In contrast, the purported purchaser's implied representation of
intent to pay or to honor the check is, by definition, untruthful.
(1986) (issue is whether bad checks are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false
representations); In re Rea Bros., 251 F. 431, 432 (D. Mont. 1917) (debtor's check was false
representation that check would be paid on presentation, not "false statement").
101 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1988) (exceptions to discharge include "money,
property, services . .. " obtained by "false representation") with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)
(1988) (exceptions to discharge include "money, property, services . . ." obtained by use of
"statement in writing... that is materially false").
M62 See In re Roberts, 82 Bankr. 179, 182 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). "The court in Wil-
liams was dealing with a statute which speaks of 'statement or report' rather than one refer-
ring to 'false pretense' or 'false representations' which are more apt phrases for describing
the act of negotiating a check." Id. (emphasis in original).
13 Williams, 458 U.S. at 284.
I Id. at 285. The Court stated:
As defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 U.L.A. 17 (1977), a check is simply
"a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand," § 3-104(2)(b), which "con-
tain[s] an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money," [cita-
tion omitted]. As such, "[tihe drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and
any necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft to
the holder."
Id. (quoting § 3-413(2), 2 U.L.A. 424 (1977)).
115 Id. at 282.
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Fifth, the Williams Court was troubled by the effect of the
government's approach. 166 That is, if it were to find an implied
representation that the drawer did have "funds on deposit suffi-
cient to cover the face value [of the check],"l67 its judgment could
lead to successful criminal prosecution of persons who acted with-
out any intent to defraud.'68 However, application of an implied
representation approach to a purported purchaser under section
523(a)(2)(A) would impose no hardship on an honest debtor. The
creditor would still be required to prove that the debtor had acted
with fraudulent intent.
Finally, in deciding that the defendant's conduct did not fall
within the "false statement" language of the statute before it, the
Williams Court relied heavily on legislative history.66 The legisla-
tive history of section 523(a)(2)(A), in contrast, requires that the
section apply to the purported purchaser.1 0
Despite the many ways in which the Williams decision is dis-
tinguishable, a number of courts have found it to be persuasive. In
the recent decision of In re Horwitz,"7 the court determined
whether the issuance of a check amounts to an implied representa-
tion of sufficient funds on account to cover the check. 72 Acknowl-
edging that a number of courts have found such an implied repre-
sentation, the Horwitz court declared that cases taking the
contrary position "ha[d] the support of a Supreme Court
case[,]'7 namely Williams. Specifically, the court stated:
[Williams] analyzed the nature of a check and stated that issuing
a check "did not involve the making of a 'false statement,' for a
simple reason: technically speaking, a check is not a factual asser-
tion at all, and therefore cannot be characterized as 'true' or
'false'" [citation omitted]. Thus, the necessary element under
Section 1014 of a false statement is missing. By a parity of rea-
soning, the necessary element under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of a
false representation is similarly missing.17 4
"I Id. at 286.
:67 Id. at 286 n.7.
188 Id. at 286-87.
169 Id. at 288-90.
170 See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
7 100 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
172 Id. at 398.
73 Id.
174 Id.
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Citing other recent opinions which followed Williams,17 5 the Hor-
witz court concluded that the issuance of a check drawn on insuffi-
cient funds does not constitute a false representation under section
523(a)(2)(A). 17 6 Yet, the court did not consider the possibility that
the word "representation," as used in section 523(a)(2)(A), might
be broader than the word "statement."
Most importantly, Horwitz ignored the fact that section
523(a)(2)(A) designates actual fraud as a separate ground for deny-
ing a discharge; the defendant in Williams was, notably, not found
innocent of actual fraud. Even if the words "statement" and "rep-
resentation" were synonymous, Williams is irrelevant to a denial
of discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A). Purported purchasers
commit actual fraud by buying goods or services without the intent
to pay for them. The fact that a purported purchaser promotes the
deception by issuing a check in no way diminishes the fraud.
A number of other courts have relied on Williams in interpret-
171 Id. The court cited three cases it believed were governed by the Williams decision
which concerned issues under section 523(a)(2)(A). In re Tuggle, 86 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1988); In re Hunter, 83 Bankr. 803 (M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Ethridge, 80 Bankr. 581
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987). An argument can be made that the Horwitz court misinterpreted
both Ethridge and Tuggle. Ethridge, for example, can be read as having rejected the credi-
tor's argument for reasons unrelated to Williams. The Ethridge court acknowledged that
section 523(a)(2)(A) established three standards for nondischargeability. However, it specifi-
cally resolved the issue without relying on or even mentioning Williams. Specifically, the
Ethridge court stated:
Courts are divided on the question of whether the issuance of a check that is
ultimately dishonored for insufficient funds is a false representation. This Court
need not address this issue in the present adversary proceeding, however, since
Plaintiff has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant had
the requisite intent to deceive Plaintiff when the first set of checks was issued.
Id. at 587-88.
Tuggle, on the other hand, did cite Williams for the proposition that the mere issuance
of checks drawn on insufficient funds is not enough to constitute "actionable representa-
tion" under section 523(a)(2)(A). See Tuggle, 86 Bankr. at 615. Nevertheless, in a footnote
supporting this proposition, Tuggle cited several cases which held that if the creditor ad-
duces evidence proving that the debtor did not intend to make the checks good when she
issued them, the debts would be nondischargeable. Id. at 615 n.1.
178 Horwitz, 100 Bankr. at 398. If the court had found that issuance of the check consti-
tuted an implied representation, it would have had to consider whether the debtor made the
implied representation with fraudulent intent. At the outset of its discussion, the court dis-
tinguished these different elements of a section 523(a)(2)(A) action. Id. at 397. Another
plaintiff in the consolidated action alleged that actual oral representations had accompanied
issuance of checks. Id. at 399. The court noted that the oral representations would satisfy
the "representation" requirement not met as to the first plaintiff, and the court proceeded
to consider whether the debtor had made the oral statements with fraudulent intent. Id. at
402.
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ing either section 523(a)(2)(A) 1 or section 523(a)(2)(B). 178 Other
courts have inquired as to whether Williams is binding precedent
and decided the matters before them on different grounds en-
tirely. 7 9 A few courts specifically have rejected Williams,8° while
others, without reference to Williams, have held that the issuance
of a check is an implied representation upon which a nondischarge
may be predicated.' 8 '
The Williams decision should have no significant effect on the
scope of section 523(a)(2)(A) even under the implied representa-
tion theory. Under the "actual fraud" standard, Williams would
obviously be irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
The dischargeability of purported purchaser debt is an issue
that arises repeatedly in bankruptcy courts nationwide. Courts
currently employ differing rules which result in nonuniform deci-
sions. Some of the approaches applied by the courts are concep-
tually inadequate, while others seem substantively unattractive.
Moreover, misconstruction of the Williams case has influenced
courts to reach an incorrect outcome in bad check cases.
The actual fraud standard most flexibly and comprehensively
accommodates the policy objectives of section 523(a)(2)(A). Histor-
ical indications, both legislative and judicial, confirm the conclu-
sion that the actual fraud test was what Congress intended to be
used to determine the dischargeability of purported purchaser
debt. There should be no formal distinction regarding whether the
purported purchaser uses a check, credit card, or open line of
credit to purchase goods, property, or services. Actual fraud, which
"I See, e.g., In re Hunter, 83 Bankr. 803, 804 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (issuance of check not
representation of sufficient funds in account); In re Jenkins, 61 Bankr. 30, 39-40 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1986) (same); In re Hammett, 49 Bankr. 533, 534-35 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (same).
178 See Ethridge, 80 Bankr. at 588.
178 See In re Roberts, 82 Bankr. 179, 182 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re Burgstaler, 58
Bankr. 508, 512-14 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
"I See In re Lewsadder, 84 Bankr. 711, 714-15 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988) (citing In re
Kurdoghlian, 30 Bankr. 500, 502 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), which did not refer to Williams).
181 See In re Pokrandt, 54 Bankr. 691, 692 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (issuance of check
with fraudulent purpose satisfies representation requirement); In re Perkins, 52 Bankr. 355,
357 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (issuance of checks is implied representation that funds are
available to honor them); In re Mullin, 51 Bankr. 377, 378 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985) (same).
[Vol. 64:2:253
1990] DISCHARGEABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY 287
may be committed without any express misrepresentation, should
be sufficient to deny dischargeability under section 523(a).

